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THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
A NO-FAULT SYSTEM FOR TIE COMPENSATION OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT VICTIMS IN PENNSYLVANIA -

INTRODUCTION

T HE CONCEPT OF NO-FAULT automobile accident compensation has become an increasingly prominent subject of debate on
both the national and local levels.' The most common of these plans,
reduced to their essentials, embody two basic principles: (1) coverage,
regardless of fault, for out-of-pocket economic losses up to a selected
limit; and (2) the limitation or elimination of tort damage recovery
based on negligence except for economic losses above the non-fault
benefits and for damages for pain and suffering in cases of severe
injury. In other words, under the no-fault schemes, benefits would
be available to auto accident victims regardless of who was at fault in
the accident, while traditional tort recovery for pain and suffering
would be available only for specified categories of serious injuries.'
The concept of no-fault compensation has found favor with many
state and federal agencies, law professors, economists, and several
state legislatures.' In brief, the proponents of no-fault compensation
systems contend that the application of traditional negligence law to
automobile accidents in our modern, urban, motorized society results
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1968;
J.D., Harvard University, 1971.
1. See, e.g., No-Fault Catches Fire, TIME, Mar. 6, 1972, at 64.
2. See, e.g., Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, in
CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 43-44 (hereinafter cited as CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE).
3. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM (1965); STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE - FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT - A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR (1970) [hereinafter cited as the NEW
YORK REPORT] ; J. Volpe, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and their Compensation in the
United States in A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (U.S. Dep't of
Transp. 1971) [hereinafter cited as the VOLPE REPORT] ; Note, The Massachusetts
"No Fault" Automobile Insurance Law: An Analysis and Proposed Revision, 8
HARV. J. LEGIs. 455 (1971).
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in serious inefficiencies, inequities and misallocations of resources.
Critics of the tort law system charge that the fault system has clogged
the courts, delayed the payment of benefits to the injured, inflated
claims, raised insurance premiums, overcompensated trivial claims
while undercompensating serious ones, denied many injured plaintiffs
any recovery because of their contributory negligence or inability to
prove fault on the defendant's part, and wasted billions of dollars in
futile legal battles over the determination of fault.4
Opponents of no-fault accident compensation have mounted vigorous attacks of their own." Their principal contention is that no-fault
proposals compromise the right of accident victims to full recovery of
"intangible" losses such as pain and suffering. They have insisted
that the elimination of common law rights is not only unwise and
unjust, but also offensive to the requirements of the federal and state
constitutions. Forces opposed to no-fault legislation in Pennsylvania
have insisted that any statutory interference with the traditional tort
recovery for pain and suffering would clearly violate article 3, section
18 of the Pennsylvania constitution,6 which provides that, except for
employment-related injuries, "in no ...cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries ... ."' This provision
is said to clearly stand in the way of statutes which would abolish the
right of any auto accident victim to recover in tort for full pain and
suffering damages.
This study is devoted to an analysis of the obstacles in both the
federal and Pennsylvania constitutions to the implementation of a nofault compensation system by the Pennsylvania legislature. Particular
attention is devoted to the narrow but particularly pertinent question
of whether abolition of recovery for pain and suffering in certain
specified categories of accident cases would necessarily violate article
3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution.

II.

No-FAULT INSURANCE

PLANS AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION

The weight of authority indicates that implementation of a no-fault
automobile insurance system would not violate the due process and equal
4. See, e.g., THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS: THE NO-FAULT
PRINCIPLE (1972).
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS (1971).

6. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 20, 1972, § B, at 1,
col. 6.
7. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18 (emphasis added).
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protection provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
federal constitution and similar provisions found in state constitutions.
The issue is no longer confined to the academic arena; the Massachusetts no-fault plan withstood constitutional challenges in Pinnick v.
Cleary.8 Under the Massachusetts statute,9 an injured person may sue
to recover damages for pain and suffering only if: (1) the reasonable
medical expenses incurred exceed $500 or (2) the victim suffered a
specified type of bodily injury, such as loss of a body member, permanent disfigurement, loss of sight or hearing, or a fracture. The Massachusetts constitution does not contain a provision comparable to article
3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution, but the Massachusetts
decision did consider the other basic constitutional issues.' °
It should be noted, however, that a lower court in Illinois has
found that the requirements of due process and equal protection are
not met by a no-fault statute which makes the amount of damages
recoverable for pain and suffering dependent upon the dollar amount
of reasonable medical expenses."

The Illinois no-fault statute 12 lim-

ited recovery in tort actions for pain and suffering to an amount equal
to 50 per cent of the first $500 of reasonable medical expenses and 100
per cent of such expenses over $500. The court in that case stated
that "the vast disparity in hospital costs and physicians' charges
throughout the state results in a patently arbitrary and unreasonable
discrimination among persons to whom the 'general damage' limitations of [the act] apply .

. . .""

The court also noted that, under the

scheme of the Illinois statute, first-party benefits would not be recoverable by an injured person who was not covered by auto insurance
(because, for example, he did not own a car) unless he was struck
by an insured motorist. Whether the defendant was insured would be
a "purely fortuitous circumstance," according to the court, since Illinois
is not a compulsory insurance state.' 4 In short, the court found that
the statute invidiously discriminated against poor people who did not
own cars, did not have insurance or incurred less medical expense,
8.

- Mass. _, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D, (Supp. 1971). See Keeton &
O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71 COLUM.
9. MAss.

L. REV, 241, 252 (1971).

10. The Pinnick court found that the Massachusetts plan did not run afoul of
the relevant provisions of the Massachusetts constitution: MAss. CONST. pt. 1, arts. 1,
10, 12; pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4; Pinnick v. Cleary, __ Mass. at __ n.8, 271 N.E.2d at
601 n.8 (1971).
11. Grace v. Howlett, No. 71 CH 4737 (Cir. Ct., Ch., Cook County, Ill.,
Dec. 29,
1971), reported in 40 U.S.L.W. 2437 (Jan. 18, 1972).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150 (1969).
13. 40 U.S.L.W. at 2437-38.
14. Id.
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thereby creating "arbitrary, discriminatory and invidious classifications
of persons and groups.' 6
The Illinois decision poses no serious challenge to no-fault legislation because the features found objectionable in the Illinois statute
could be modified to obviate constitutional infirmities. One remedy
could be to make insurance coverage compulsory. Medical expense
could be measured by a fixed standard that would eliminate differences
based on hospital and physician charges; for example, so much for
each day in a hospital, so much for a type of medical or surgical
operation or treatment. Also, a statute which allowed recovery for
pain and suffering in cases of specified bodily injuries, not based on the
dollar amount of medical expense, such as cases of "severe disfigurement" or "loss of body members," would avoid the issue raised in
the Illinois decision. Finally, it is doubtful that other courts would
agree with that court's rather strict application of the equal protection
and due process requirements. 16
In Pinnick, it was stipulated that the plaintiff could have recovered
$800 for pain and suffering in an ordinary tort action, but because
his medical expenses did not exceed $500 and his injury did not fall
within one of the special categories, the Massachusetts law did not
permit suit for pain and suffering. The court viewed the basic concept
of the new law as follows:
[T]he statute affords the citizen the security of prompt and
certain recovery to a fixed amount of the most salient elements of
his out-of-pocket expenses . .

.

.In return for this he surrenders

the possibly minimal damages for pain and suffering recoverable
in cases not marked by serious economic loss or objective indicia
of grave injury ....17

The court dealt with the argument that the standards in the statute
might operate in some cases to disqualify claims for serious amounts
of pain and suffering:
The purpose of the Legislature in limiting recovery in this way
was clearly to eliminate minor claims for pain and suffering ....
The Legislature could reasonably have thought that the number
of such cases was largely attributable to speculative and exag15. Id. It should be noted that in Pinnick, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
expressly declined to consider the issue of invidious discrimination against the poor
under that state's no-fault statute, which employs a $500 medical expense threshold
for general damages recovery, because the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to

come forward with evidence on this point. -_ Mass. at _, 271 N.E.2d at 611.
Massachusetts is also a compulsory insurance state.
16. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, -_ Mass. _, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), wherein
the court held that "[s]ome inequality in result is not enough to vitiate a legislative
classification grounded in reason." Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 610, citing Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913).
17. __ Mass. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 597.
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gerated claims8 for pain and suffering in instances of relatively
minor injury.'

The court added:
A necessary corollary of the decision was that the minor
claims had to be eliminated according to objective, easily applicable rules. If the rules were themselves subjective .. .the per-

ceived evils would continue. Courts might well be clogged with
claimants ... "
The court admitted that, in spite of the statute's attempt to specify
certain objective criteria of serious injury, "the $500 limit will exclude
many sizable claims for pain and suffering which do not at the same
time fall within the five other categories." Nevertheless, it maintained that "[s]ome inequality in result is not enough to vitiate a
legislative classification grounded in reason."2 Thus, the court found
no violation of due process or equal protection guarantees.
The argument that abolition of a common law right of recovery
violated due process was rejected using analogies to cases which upheld
the constitutionality of the statutory abolition of the action for breach
of promise to marry and the abolition of a guest's common law right
to recover from the careless driver of an automobile for ordinary
negligence. 2' The court also posited that the no-fault statute provides
a reasonable substitute for pre-existing common law rights, relying
on the United States Supreme Court decision in New York Central
Railroad Co. v. White,2 2 in which a compulsory state workmen's
compensation act was upheld against federal constitutional attack.
There both the employee and employer surrendered certain rights they
had at common law in exchange for a new compensatory system, which
was deemed to be a reasonably adequate substitute.2"
Professor Bishop of Yale University has addressed himself to
the question of whether the basic protection no-fault plan proposed
by Professors Keeton and O'Connell, which abolishes the victim's
right to recover for the first $5,000 of pain and suffering, would
violate the fifth or fourteenth amendments of the Constitution by
depriving the victim of property without due process of law and by
denying him the equal protection of the laws.24 Professor Bishop con18. Id. at

__

271 N.E.2d at 609.

19. Id. at
, 271 N.E.2d at 610.
20. Id. at _ 271 N.E.2d at 610.
21. Id. at
, 271 N.E.2d at 602.
22. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
23. Id. at 198-200.
24. Bishop, The Validity Under the Constitution of the United States of Basic
Protection Insurance, in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Auto. Ins. & Compensation Study 1970).
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sidered the constitutional issues raised by a no-fault statute analogous
to those that were raised fifty years ago by workmen's compensation
schemes2 5 which limited the amount recoverable for injury and abolished the tort recovery for pain and suffering. However, those statutes
were held to be constitutional because they substituted a certain and
speedy remedy for the uncertainty and delay of tort law.26 Thus, under
both no-fault plans and workmen's compensation schemes, the injured
person is not totally deprived of a reasonably adequate remedy. This
is sufficient to satisfy due process and equal protection requirements.
Indeed, Professor Bishop asserted that there is authority for the view
that a state legislature may totally abolish a common law cause of
action, without providing any substitute relief, if the legislature reasonably believes that the cause of action "produces greater evils than those
which it was created to remedy." He pointed to state statutes which
have abolished the actions for alienation of affections, breach of promise
to marry and recovery by a guest in an automobile against the driver."'
The constitutionality of compulsory workmen's compensation statutes under the federal constitution was resolved in New York Central
Railroad Co. v. White.2" Since the New York Workmen's Compensation Act was compulsory for both employer and employee, it was argued
that the deprivation of old common law rights and the imposition of
new liabilities and benefits violated federal due process and equal protection requirements. The Supreme Court first held that neither of
these constitutional guarantees in the fourteenth amendment prohibited
a state legislature from modifying the common law rights and duties
surrounding the concept of negligence: "[T]he nature and extent of
the duty may be modified by legislation, with corresponding change
in the test of negligence." 29 The Court maintained that the tort laws
of negligence, as they affected employers and employees, could be
altered by the legislature in the public interest: "No person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall
remain unchanged for his benefit."" ° The Court, however, took pains
to emphasize that it had not held that a state would encounter no
constitutional obstacles if it set aside all common law rules regulating
the liability between employer and employee, without providing a
"reasonably just substitute."'" The New York workmen's compensa25. Id. at 44-47.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 51-52. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929)
mobile guest statute held to be constitutional).
28. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
29. Id. at 198.

(Connecticut auto-

30. Id.
31. Id. at 201.
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tion statute did not present such a question, however, for the Court
reasoned that:
If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in
case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is
entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has
a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense
of establishing negligence or proving the amount of damages.3 2
It added that the compensation for injuries prescribed by the statute
had not been attacked as unreasonable in amount. 3
It should be added that, when the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act was tested in Anderson v.
Carnegie Steel Co., 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court in holding that no person
has a vested interest in any rule of the common law. 3 It was argued
in Anderson that taking away the employer's common law defenses
was a deprivation of property without due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating: "[T]he common law itself may be changed by statute, and, from the time it is
changed, it operates in the future only as changed." 36
In Silver v. Silver, 7 the United States Supreme Court held that
when a tort cause of action becomes a source of "vexatious litigation,"
a state legislature may abolish it without violating the due process
and equal protection guarantees in the Constitution." The statute in
question was Connecticut's guest statute, which prohibited a guest in
an automobile from suing the driver for ordinary negligence, as opposed
to gross or wanton negligence. The Court held that the Constitution
"does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old
ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative
object." '3' The abolition of the guest's cause of action for ordinary
negligence can easily be analogized to the abolition of small claims for
pain and suffering. The latter are alleged by many studies to be
responsible for a serious increase in the evils of "vexatious litigation."4
Therefore, their abolition under a no-fault plan would seem to en32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Scheme

Id.
Id. at 205-06.
255 Pa. 33, 99 A.2d 215 (1916).
Id. at 37-38, 99 A.2d at 216.
Id. at 37, 99 A.2d at 216.
280 U.S. 117 (1929).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.
See, e.g., NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 3,at 26-29; Note, A Social Insurance
for Accident Compensation, 57 VA. L. REv. 409, 438 (1971).
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counter no serious objection on grounds of the due process or equal
protection clauses.
III.

OBSTACLES TO No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN THE

PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND

ARTICLE ONE, SECTIONS SIX

ELEVEN, AND ARTICLE THREE, SECTION EIGHTEEN

It has been noted that constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection do not prevent the adoption of a no-fault compensation system by a state legislature. However, the constitution of
Pennsylvania contains three additional provisions which may pose
problems in the implementation of a compulsory no-fault system.
The first two of these provisions present obstacles which are not insurmountable. The third, however, presents a serious problem.
A.

Article 1, Section 6

Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate.41
With respect to the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, it
should first be noted that Professors Keeton and O'Connell have
stated that the provision for non-jury trial of small claims under their
basic protection no-fault plan is not essential.42 If the restriction presented by the right to trial by jury in the determination of no-fault
claims were removed, this would obviate constitutional objections based
on the jury trial guarantee.43
It should be noted a plan for compulsory arbitration of small
civil claims of auto victims would not be unconstitutional in Pennsylvania, so long as the right to appeal from the award were provided.
In Application of Smith,44 it was held that "there is no denial of the

right of trial by jury if the statute preserves that right to each of
the parties by the allowance of an appeal from the decision of the
arbitrators or other tribunal. '4' The court added: "All that is required is that the right of appeal for the purpose of presenting the
issue to a jury must not be burdened by the imposition of onerous
' 46
conditions . . . which would make the right practically unavailable.
41. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
42. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 504.
43. See Ruben & Williams, The Constitutionality of Basic Protection, 1 CONN.
L. REv. 44, 55 (1968) ; Bishop, supra note 24, at 25, 57-58.
44. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
45. Id. at 230, 122 A.2d at 629.
46. Id. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629. In that case, a requirement that the party
appealing pay the arbitrator's fee was held not to be an undue burden.
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If it were considered vital to have a non-jury determination of
no-fault claims, an argument could be made that these claims do not
involve a common law action, but rather a new statutory action.
Such an answer has been given to objections of an unconstitutional
denial of a jury trial in the workmen's compensation area. Professors
Keeton and O'Connell have explained this argument as follows: "Under
such a view, the right to jury trial is merely ancillary to the common
law action, and when the common law action disappears, the right
to jury trial disappears along with it."'4 7 The test to be applied by the

courts would be to ask whether the new action closely resembles the
common law action it replaces. Professors Keeton and O'Connell
argue that the new basic protection action is unlike the tort action
in the following ways: (1) it is not based on the principles of negligence law or on fault; (2) it is directed against the victim's insurer
rather than the alleged wrongdoer; and (3) it has eliminated the
recovery for pain and suffering."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court never squarely faced the jury
trial question in connection with workmen's compensation, because
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act has been viewed as
a "voluntary," not compulsory, system. In Pennsylvania, a statutory
procedure is set out whereby an employee may express his desire
not to be regulated by the workmen's compensation system. 49 Thus,
by its terms the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act does
not apply if it is rejected by the employee in the manner prescribed
by the statute.5" Formally at least, the Pennsylvania act is contractual;
the employee by contract may elect to have compensation for injuries
determined in the manner provided by statute. Thus, when the original
Pennsylvania act faced its first court test in Anderson v. Carnegie
Steel Co., 5 in which the argument was made that the act violated the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, the court answered that under
the scheme of the act no party is deprived of a trial by jury "except
by his own consent." 52
Bills to amend the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
to make it compulsory on employer and employee have been introduced
into the legislature, but none have passed, primarily due to the constitutional objection over the right to jury trial:
47. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 496-97.
48. Id. at 497.
49. PA. STAT. tit. 77, § 461 (1952).
50. W.

SKINNER,

THE

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

LAW

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

45-47 (4th ed. 1947).
51. 255 Pa. 33, 99 A.2d 215 (1916).
52. Id. at 39, 99 A.2d at 217.
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These proposed amendments while seeking to change the
plan from a voluntary to a compulsory system, also sought to
maintain the present form of enforcement through administrative
tribunals and not through courts with jury trials. Constitutional
objections to a compulsory law which would deprive the parties of
the right53 to trial by jury were interposed and the bills were
rejected.

Thus, the Pennsylvania law remains a voluntary system, at least formally. We say "formally" because some commentators have asserted
that the elective feature of "voluntary" workmen's compensation acts
is a fiction or a mere technicality. Professors Keeton and O'Connell
have cited a Massachusetts study which could discover no case in
which an employee had exercised his election to rely on the traditional
tort law. An employer would not be obligated to hire an employee
who refused his rights under the compensation act and elected to
maintain his right to sue his employer at common law.5 4 In light of
these observations, it is questionable whether the fictional consensual
waiver of the right to jury trial would be given much weight in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court today.
The issue of the right to a jury trial involves intricacies beyond
the scope of this study; however, it should be emphasized that the
abolition of a jury determination of no-fault benefits is not an essential
feature of the no-fault concept. As has been pointed out, arbitration
for small claims could be provided in its place. The serious constitutional question is raised by that dey principle of auto insurance reformers which calls for the elimination of negligence actions for minor
cases of pain and suffering. The elimination of this feature of the
present tort system is viewed as essential to the efficiency, fairness,
and practicability of a no-fault system.
B.

Article 1, Section 11

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay.55
The next question to arise is whether article 1, section 11 of the
Pennsylvania constitution stands in the way of a statutory abolition
of tort claims for pain and suffering. Provisions substantially similar
to that section are found in the constitutions of almost two dozen
53. W.

54. R.

SIuNNER, supra note 50,
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,

at 47.

supra note 3, at 498-99.

55. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss5/1
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These provisions speak of a right to legal redress for injury.

7

The effect of such provisions on the legislature's authority to abolish
a common law cause of action, with or without providing a substitute
remedy, has been the subject of controversy in many cases. The
prevalent view today, however, is that such provisions are not intended
as restraints on the legislature, but rather are meant to preserve
procedural fairness for the injured person. 1
The precise relationship between a provision such as section 11
and a no-fault proposal was decided in Pinnick"9 where the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that state's
no-fault system. Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights guarantees "a certain remedy for having recourse to the laws,
for all injuries or wrongs which . . . [one] may receive . ..

."

It

was argued that this provision prevented the state legislature from
abolishing those causes of action for pain and suffering which the
Massachusetts no-fault law sought to isolate. The court said that
article XI of the Declaration of Rights was "clearly directed toward
the preservation of procedural rights . . . ,"60 adding that "changes

in prior law are necessary in any ordered society." 61
The view expressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
not always been held by the high courts of other states. In Heck v.
Schupp,62 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that article II, section 19
of the Illinois constitution, which is substantially identical to article 1,
section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution barred the enactment of
the Illinois "Heart Balm" Act. That act made it unlawful for any
person to file a pleading seeking to recover upon any civil cause of
action based upon alienation of affections or breach of contract to
marry. The decision cited no authorities justifying the application of
the constitutional provisions for this purpose, nor did it engage in
any serious constitutional analysis.
The Heck doctrine was not consistent with an earlier Illinois
Supreme Court decision which upheld the constitutionality of the
56. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6; ARK.
II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 6;
ME. CONST. art I, § 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; Miss.
CONST. art. III, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 6; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 13; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35; N.D. CONST. § 22;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 16; ORE. CONST. art. I. § 10; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. art. I, § 4; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; WYO. CONST.
CONST. art.

art. I, § 8.
57. Ruben & Williams, supra note 43, at 45.
58. Id.
59.
Mass. ___ 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
60. Id. at ___ 271 N.E.2d at 600.

61. Id.
62. 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
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guest statute in that state. 8 In that case, it was held that such
legislation did not violate article II, section 19 of the Illinois constitution. The court stated: "[That section] does not give a vested right
not subject to change by legislative power, provided the change is
reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare of the people
and does not destroy a remedy."64 The new law did not strip the
victim of all remedies since he could sue for aggravated carelessness;
however, he was deprived of a cause of action for ordinary negligence.
The Heck decision lost most of its significance, however, when
a revised "Heart Balm" Act was held constitutional in Smith v. Hill.65
This act did not totally abolish actions for breach of promise to marry
or alienation of affection, but it robbed these common law causes of
action of most of their practical significance. In an action for breach
of promise to marry and for seduction, the new law disallowed recovery of damages for degradation, humiliation, and mental anguish.
The court stated that there was no violation of article II, section 19 of
the Illinois constitution since the legislation only limited recoverable
damages without totally abolishing the cause of action, thus distinguishing the Heck decision. The dissent in the Smith case noted
that the legislation barred damages compensatory in character and, in
effect, limited the plaintiff to nominal damages. 66
The notion that a constitutional provision similar to article 1,
section 11 of Pennsylvania's constitution exercises some restraint upon
the legislature's power to abolish common law causes of action and
modifying the substantive common law of rights and duties was dealt
with in Lebohm v. City of Galveston.67 There it was argued that the
charter granted to the City of Galveston by the Texas legislature
violated article I, section 13 of the Texas constitution68 because it
purported to confer immunity from tort actions upon the city. The
court held that the section in question denied to legislative bodies the
right to arbitrarilyabolish causes of action. The court stated that the
legislature can properly abolish a common law right of recovery if
63. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943). "Guest" statutes,
of which Pennsylvania has none, prohibit a person who is injured while riding as a
guest in an automobile from recovering from his host unless it is shown that the
host was guilty of wanton or reckless conduct.
64. Id. at 576, 52 N.E.2d at 236.
65. 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958).
66. Id. at 590, 147 N.E.2d at 877 (dissenting opinion). See also Siegall v.
Solomon, 19 Ill. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960), wherein disallowance of damages for
mental suffering and humiliation in an action for alienation of affection was held not
to violate article II, section 19 of the Illinois constitution.
67. 275 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. 1955).
68. Article I, section 11 of the Texas constitution, substantially similar to
article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law.
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it provides a reasonable substitute or if the abolition of the cause of
action is a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of
the general welfare. 9 The court therefore upheld the constitutionality
of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act because that legislation
"substituted a different but certain and adequate legal remedy for the
one that existed at common law."7
It can readily be seen that the holding in the Lebohm case amounts
to a restraint upon legislative power no greater than the restraint to
which legislatures are subject under the general requirements of due
process and equal protection. 7 ' Cases decided under article II, section
6 of the Colorado constitution, 72 a provision substantially similar to
article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution, shed further
light on how this general mandate is construed by the courts. The
constitutionality of a legislative abolition of all civil causes of action
for breach of promise to marry and alienation of affection was upheld
in Goldberg v. Musim. 73 The court construed that section of Colorado's

constitution as a mandate to the judiciary, rather than to the legislature, and held that the provision does not preserve causes of action
at common law against non ex post facto legislative change. The
legislature was held to possess the legal power to totally abolish these
causes of action except where the injury occurred prior to enactment
of the legislation.74
In Vogts v. Guerrette,75 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld that
state's guest statute against the challenge that it violated article II,

section 6 of the Colorado constitution, since it abolished tort actions
for ordinary negligence. The court noted that many states have provisions substantially similar to those of Colorado, but that none of
these states had decided that such a constitutional provision prohibited
7
the legislature from changing common law duties in like situations. 1
69. 275 S.W.2d at 955.
70. Id. at 954.
71. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); Silver v. Silver,
280 U.S. 117 (1929). See also text accompanying notes 24-40 upra. Basic notions
of equal protection and due process would restrain a state legislature from arbitrarily
(without any rational foundation in terms of public policy) abolishing a common
law cause of action. In New York Central, the United States Supreme Court
intimated that the setting aside of all common law rules of liability regarding employer
and employee might be deemed arbitrary, if no "reasonable just substitute" were
provided in their place. 243 U.S. at 201.
72. COLO. CONST. art. 1, § 6 provides:
Courts of Justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should
be administered without sale, denial or delay.
73. 162 Colo. 461, 427 P.2d 698 (1967).
74. Id. at 469-71, 427 P.2d at 702-03. The court relied on Silver v. Silver, 280
U.S. 117 (1929). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
75. 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960).
76. Id. at 531-34, 351 P.2d at 854-55.
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The court distinguished a recent Kentucky decision17 striking down
that state's guest statute on the basis that Kentucky, unlike Colorado,
had a constitutional provision which prohibited the legislature from
limiting the amount of damages recoverable in an action for personal
injury or property damage. The Kentucky precedent, while proving
to be no obstacle for the Colorado court,78 may, as will be seen, have
a larger effect in Pennsylvania, since the Kentucky constitutional
provision is quite similar to article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania
constitution.
The Vogts court explained that provisions such as article II,
section 6 of the Colorado constitution are designed to insure that when
a duty has been breached producing a legal claim, the claimant thereafter cannot be denied a remedy. Such provisions do not
bar the
79
legislature from redefining legal duties or rules of liability.

It is interesting to note Justice Frantz' dissenting opinion in Vogts,
since it foreshadowed some of the arguments advanced by opponents of
no-fault accident compensation plans. Justice Frantz vigorously objected to the legislature's attempt to abolish the injured victim's claim
for damages for negligence under the guest statute:
Broken bodies, loss of eyes or limb, and even loss of life,
resulting from negligence of the host, must go uncompensated,
no matter how meritorious the claim of the non-paying guest,
because in the exercise of the police power an end must be put to
those suits in which hosts and guests collude to mulct insurance
companies in damages. What injustice to the many claims based
upon the legitimate ground of negligence!
If collusion and perjury warrant legislation such as the
Guest Statute, perhaps the legislature could with as much justification do away with trial courts .

. .

. [T]he police power with

equal propriety could be invoked to put an end to trial process
in order to prevent collusion and perjury ...
This opinion is more than just a dissent -

it is a warning

and the sounding of an alarm. .... 80

In its essentials, this argument suggests that it is a violation of due
process and of fundamental notions of fairness and justice to deny the
injured guest recovery for injuries caused by the driver's negligence.
Justice Frantz argued that freedom from personal injury caused by
the negligence of another was "a natural right . . . a fundamental,

inherent, inalienable right," and a far more sensitive legal interest than
77. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
ing notes 165-68 infra.
78. 142 Colo. at 514, 351 P.2d at 859.
79. Id. at 531-34, 351 P.2d at 854-55.
80. Id. at 547-48, 351 P.2d at 862-63.
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mere economic or commercial loss."' The justice's strong sentiments,
however, could not overcome the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Silver v. Silver,82 that abolition of the guest's cause of action
was not arbitrary or unreasonable and therefore was not so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a violation of due process or equal
protection. However, Justice Frantz' strong sentiments probably were
never intended to apply to a restriction on recovery for pain and
suffering in cases of minor injury such as those envisioned by most
no-fault plans. In this regard, it should also be noted that the plaintiff
in Pinnick v. Cleary8 argued that the tort actions abolished by the
Massachusetts no-fault law safeguarded "fundamental rights of personal security and bodily integrity," but the Massachusetts Supreme
Court denied that the abolition of these minor pain and suffering
recoveries unconstitutionally impinged on fundamental personal righfts.8 4
It may be seen that the consensus of the state courts have construed constitutional provisions substantially identical to article 1,
section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution as not posing a bar to
legislation designed to implement a no-fault automobile accident compensation system. Thus, although there is strong reason to predict
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would subscribe to this view,
several Pennsylvania decisions contain dicta which preclude making
such a prediction with total assurance.
For example, in Thirteenth & Fifteenth Street Passenger Ry.
v. Boudrou,5 a Pennsylvania statute 6 which limited the damages
recoverable in a tort action against a common carrier to a maximum
of $3,000 in cases of personal injuries and $5,000 in cases of death,
was declared unconstitutional in that it violated article 1, section 11
of the Pennsylvania constitution. The court spoke of "the reserved
right to every man, that for an injury done him in his person, he
shall have remedy by due course of law."8 " The court added:
The people have withheld power from the legislature and the
courts to deprive them of that remedy, or to circumscribe it so
that a jury can only give a pitiful fraction of the damage sustained. Nothing less than the full amount of pecuniary damage
which a man suffers from an injury done to him . . . fills the
measure secured to him in the Declaration of Rights . . . . A
limitation of recovery to a sum less than the actual damage, is
81. Id. at 560-61, 351 P.2d at 869-70.
82. 280 U.S. 117 (1959). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
83.
84.
85.
86.
infra.

__ Mass. ... 271 N.E.2d 592.
Id. at _ 271 N.E.2d at 599-601.
92 Pa. 475 (1880).
Act of April 4, 1868, Pub. L. No. 58. See text accompanying notes 106-17

87. 92 Pa. at 481.
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palpably in conflict with the right to remedy by the due course
of law.88
The interpretation of article 1, section 11 set forth in Boudrou
need not be viewed as establishing a constitutional obstacle to the
implementation of a no-fault compensation system, so long as that
system provides injured persons with reasonable and fair compensation
for their injuries. To maintain the proper perspective, it must be
emphasized that the strong sentiments expressed in Boudrou were
focused on the highly unpopular act in question, under which a very
seriously injured person was limited to a maximum recovery of $3,000,
regardless of the extent of his economic loss or pain and suffering.
Furthermore, while some might read broader implications into the
language of the Boudrou case, such an interpretation would probably
not be viewed as applicable by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court today.
The fact that the Boudrou decision is almost a century old and that
the interpretation of provisions similar to Pennsylvania's in other
jurisdictions has evolved through the years indicates that a reading
of Boudrou to the effect that the legislature is prohibited from abolishing or modifying tort causes of action would not be viable today.89
The view that article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution
only requires the satisfaction of a due process standard is supported
by language in a recent Pennsylvania decision concerning the state
workmen's compensation law. In Dolan v. Linton's Lunch,9 ° an employee who was physically assaulted by another employee was allowed
to sue his employer for negligence in spite of the workmen's compensation act. Although it was held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the workmen's compensation act did not apply, the court also
offered some constitutional analysis:
To read the act so as to deny plaintiff his existing common
law remedy without permitting him to come within the protective
coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act might well violate the mandate of Article 1, Section 11. . . . [The General
Assembly is not authorized] to enact a law which vitiates an
existing common law remedy without concurrently providing for
some statutory remedy. Of course, the substituted remedy need
not be the same, but that is far different from saying that no
remedy at all may be substituted. It is only because of Article 3,
Section 21 [now article 3, section 18] and the agreement of the
88. Id. at 482.
89. See, e.g., Siegall v. Solomon, 19 Ill. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960) ; Smith v.
Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958) ; Heck v. Shupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d
464 (1946) ; Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943).
90. 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).
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parties, that the limited recovery in a Workmen's Compensation
case is valid . . . In all "other cases" nothing less than full actual
damage would satisfy the requirements of Article 1, Section 11." 1
This paragraph might be read to support the view that any no-fault
plan which would deprive an injured auto victim of his right to sue
for full compensation for his economic loss and for pain and suffering
would violate both article 1, section 11 and article 3, section 18. On
the other hand, the paragraph suggests that a substitute remedy might
be adequate to meet the requirements of article 1, section 11. The
paragraph also leaves open the possible argument that pain and suffering damages in cases of minor injury are not necessarily encompassed
by the term "full actual damage." Finally, the paragraph should be
interpreted in light of the fact that the Pennsylvania legislature has
abolished several tort causes of action without providing any substitute
remedy at all.92
Finally, scrutiny of the precise language of article 1, section 11
reinforces the conclusion that it was never intended to deny the legislature the power to abolish or redefine tort causes of action. The provision states that "every man for an injury done him . . . shall have
remedy by due course of law. . . ." Pennsylvania decisions which have
construed the operative term "injury" indicate that this expression
refers to "legal wrongs" such as would entitle a claimant to damages
at common law or by statute. 3 Perhaps the most illustrative Pennsylvania case delineating the concept of "injury" is Jackman v. Rosenbaum,94 wherein the plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries
caused by the erection of a party wall. He contended that the failure of
the statute regulating party walls" to provide for the recovery of damages was in derogation of common law rights and violative of article 1,
section 11 and the present article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania
constitution. With respect to the contention grounded on article 1,
section 11, the court pointed out that "the word 'injury' in this section
of the Constitution has been construed uniformly in the strict sense of
'legal injury'."9 6 Similarly, it was said of the present article 3, section
91. Id. at 123-24, 152 A.2d at 892-93.

92. See notes 135-58 and accompanying text infra.
93. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 A. 690 (1888)
(construing the term "injury" as employed in the present Pennsylvania constitution,
article 10, section 4) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 214, 40 A.2d
461 (1945) (also construing the present Pennsylvania constitution, article 10, section
4); Manning v. Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210, 217 (1869) (construing "injury" in the
constitution of a private association to mean "unlawful infringement or privation
of rights").
94. 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919), aff'd, 260 U.S. 22 (1922).
95. Act of June 7, 1895, Pub. L. No. 135.
96. 263 Pa. at 168, 106 A. at 241.
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18 that "[w]hile, under this constitutional provision, no valid statutory
limitations may be placed upon claims for injuries recoverable at law
...it does not have .. .the effect of conferring a right of recovery
where none otherwise exists."9 7 Most importantly, the court stressed
the need for the common law to adapt to the changing requirements
of society:
The fundamental principles of the common law, while liable
to expansion, are in essence unchangeable, but their applicability
to given conditions necessarily varies according to changes
wrought by usage or statutory enactment; and, pursuing this
thought, what today is a trespass, may, by development of law,
not be so to-morrow. Therefore, it will not do to say (as plaintiff
does), since, once upon a time, at common law, the uninvited
entry upon the land of a neighbor, to build a partywall, would
have been a tort, giving rise to a claim for damages, that at the
present day such an act has all the attributes of a common law
trespass, . ..for the contention overlooks the all important fact
that, under present conditions, the law views an entry of this
character as constituting no wrongful but a wholly rightful act
... . [When] the necessity for party-walls in thickly populated
districts was recognized, and their construction authorized and
regulated, such an entry no longer constituted a trespass, and
[the builder] could not be held answerable for consequential
damages.9"
The logic of the Jackman decision supports the conclusion that
the general assembly possesses the constitutional power to abolish
certain tort causes of action which have become outmoded and unresponsive to the current needs of society. In other words, because
of the evolution of the common law and statutory developments, transactions which once gave rise to causes of action for damages may no
longer be regarded as legally actionable, and hence, no longer considered to be "injuries." Accordingly, by analogy, the constitutional
power of the general assembly to abolish recovery for pain and suffering
in specified categories of automobile accident cases can clearly be
justified.
In sum, it is very doubtful that article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution could be relied on today to prevent the state legislature from abolishing an outmoded tort cause of action, such as that
for a minor claim for pain and suffering in auto accident cases. The
dicta in the Pennsylvania cases discussed above do not completely
close the door on some kind of no-fault system for Pennsylvania.
97. Id. at 169, 106 A. at 242. See note 129 and accompanying text infra.
98. Id. at 175-76, 106 A.2d at 244.
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C. Article 3, Section 18
The final and most difficult constitutional issue concerns the effect
of provisions such as article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution on the legality of no-fault legislation.
1.

Historical Background

A new provision was added to Pennsylvania's constitution in
1874, providing that:
No Act of the General Assembly shall limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
persons or property; and, in cases of death from such injuries,
the right of action shall survive and the General Assembly shall
prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No
Act shall prescribe any limitations of time within which suits may
be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property,
or for other causes, different from those fixed by general laws
regulating actions against natural persons, and such acts, now
existing, are avoided. 9
This provision was amended to make an exception for the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act and was later renumbered.' °
A careful reading of the debates at the 1873 constitutional convention'0 1 is important, because, as was said in Lewis v. Hollahan,''
"in endeavoring to determine the full scope and meaning of the section

[what is now article 3, section 18], it should be considered, as a whole
03
in the light of the evil intended to be remedied by its adoption."'
In Lewis the convention debates were expressly relied upon by the
court in determining the meaning of the constitutional provision.0 4
99. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 21 (1874).
100. The provision was amended on November 2, 1915 and was renumbered on
May 16, 1967. The amendment inserted the following provision before the language
utilized in the original section:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers,
or employers and employes jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to
employes arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases
of employes, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such
compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special
or general remedies for the collection thereof ....
PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18.
101. See 2 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 1872-1873, 727-43 (1873) (hereinafter cited as CONVENTION DEBATES).
102. 103 Pa. 425 (1883).
103. Id. at 430.
104. Id. See also Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. 188 (1853), wherein the
court stated that "[tihe constitution is entitled, like other instruments, to a construction, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the intent of its makers." Id. at
200. The court added that the constitution should be construed in light of the
"well known evil" which was "in the minds of the convention when the amendment
was agreed on, or thought of by the people when they adopted it." Id.
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The convention debates shed light on the purpose and meaning of the
constitutional provision in question to the extent that they point out the
social evil the framers intended to deal with or to correct.
The reported debates show that article 3, section 21 of the constitution of 1874 was directed at a specific type of objectionable
legislation. In the words of one scholar:
Prior to 1873 certain statutes had been in force limiting the
amount of damages which could be recovered for personal injuries.
It was suspected that such statutes had been procured through
the influence of certain powerful corporations, and the convention
determined to put an end to such practices. 0 5
Specifically, the convention was preoccupied with the Act of April 4,
1868,"0' which limited the amount an injured person could recover
in tort actions for negligence against railroad companies and common
carriers to a maximum of $3,000 in case of personal injuries and
$5,000 in case of death. This type of legislation was the chief target
of the proponents of the constitutional provision in question. One
proponent of the provision argued:
[The Act of 1868] is a denial of right and justice for an
injury done to the person. In every case to which the Act of
1868 has been made to apply, and in which a suitor has been compelled to receive three thousand dollars in satisfaction of an injury inflicting damage to an amount exceeding that sum, the
suitor has been refused his constitutional rights ....

[W]e should

lay a strong hand upon the legislative department, and say to it,
you should not restrict the liability of a corporation or individual
in these classes of cases. The prohibition of legislation should be
clear, distinct and emphatic, so that there cannot possibly be an
evasion of its provisions. 7
There was expressed throughout the debates a very strong sentiment that a man guilty of negligence should pay full compensation to
the victim of his carelessness, and that an arbitrary limit on the
amount of damages recoverable would be unjust to the victim and
would eliminate the deterrent effect of the possibility of a heavy jury
verdict. It was argued that the jury should decide who was at fault
and the extent of damages, without being subject to an arbitrary limit
by statute.'
The arbitrariness and unfairness of a limit such as that
105. T.

WHITE, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

(1907).
106. Act of April 4, 1868, Pub. L. No. 58.
107. 2

CONVENTION DEBATES,

108. See, e.g., 2
Cochran).

OF PENNSYLVANIA

270

supra note 101, at 730 (comments of Mr. Worrell).

CONVENTION DEBATES,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss5/1

supra note 101, at 743 (comments of Mr.

20

Martel: No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Pennsylvania - A Constitutional
MAY

1972]

No-FAULT

AUTOMOBILE

NSURANCE

imposed by the Act of 1868 was repeatedly emphasized.'1° In support
of the constitutional provision it was argued that:
[One] cannot say that a man who has suffered an injury at
the hands of another shall not recover full compensation without
committing an outrage upon the elementary principles of justice."'
One advocate of the constitutional provision contended that a man
killed or disabled by a railroad might be earning $20,000 or $30,000
a year, but he or his family would be limited to a fraction of his
yearly income as a total recovery under a law such as the Act of 1868."'
The Act was therefore condemned because it would operate to deprive
some families of compensation for a large part of their catastrophic
economic loss.
The desire to preserve a heavy deterrent against negligence was
obvious among the supporters of article 3, section 21. It was posited
that :
The very fact that juries are disposed to give [high] damages,
shows that there is a feeling among the people that something
should be done in cases of railroad accidents, to compel the companies, through fear of heavy verdicts against them, to keep their
roads in such a condition
that these accidents would not be
1 12
continually occurring.

While the focus remained on railroad corporations and the preferential
treatment they received under the Act of 1868, one proponent of the
constitutional provision did argue that it would also prevent the
legislature from arbitrarily limiting the liability of, for instance,
lawyers or another professional group. But, even here, the focus was
on the need for heavy verdicts as a deterrent against carelessness."'
Those who argued against the constitutional provision and in
favor of allowing the legislature the power to pass legislation such as
the Act of 1868 insisted that the act established a reasonable limit on
the arbitrary passions and prejudices of the juries. They contended
that jury verdicts in negligence cases were often excessive and unreasonable, citing cases where the awards were grossly disproportionate
to the actual economic loss." 4 It was believed that these extravagant
109. Id. at 730, 739-40, & 743 (comments of Messrs. Worrell, J. S. Black, &
Cochran).
110. Id. at 740 (comments of Mr. J. S. Black).
111. Id. at 735 (comments of Mr. Gowen).
112. Id. at 730 (comments of Mr. Campbell). See also 2 CONVENTION DEATES,
supra note 101, at 739 (comments of Mr. J. S. Black) (heavy jury verdict represents
deterrent to railroad companies).
113. Id. at 740 (comment of Mr. J. S. Black).
114. Id. at 733 (comment of Mr. Woodward).
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verdicts increased railroad costs for the entire public, while a few
fortunate plaintiffs enjoyed a windfall.
The railroads that are compelled to pay these excessive
damages necessarily increase fares and freights, and it becomes a
burden upon the whole community, and injustice is done to all
the people that justice may be done to the party claiming the
damage.' 15
The proponents of the constitutional provision insisted, however,
that an injured victim should have the right to a jury's measurement
of his damage, without an arbitrary limit set by statute. It was suggested that better courts and better appellate review, rather than
legislative limitation, were the proper cure for extravagant verdicts." 6
Quite significantly in light of later developments, it was pointed out
that excessive verdicts were sometimes rendered in breach of promise
of marriage cases, so that the railroads were not a special case."

7

It

was maintained that a limit on the jury would cause injustice in many
cases and that this was the overriding consideration.
A reading of the arguments made in the convention debates does
not clearly show that the framers intended to prevent the legislature
from making any adjustments, no matter how fair or reasonable, to
modernize or adapt the law of torts to new social conditions. Indeed,
had they been faced with the evidence of the inadequacies of the
present tort law in dealing with auto accident compensation, the framers
of article 3, section 18 could have been expected to have allowed
the legislature the freedom to develop a fairer system of accident
compensation.
The convention debates show that article 3, section 18 was intended to wipe out laws which set a fixed ceiling on how much an
injured victim could recover from a negligent wrongdoer. The language
says "in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount
to be recovered for injuries," and this could reasonably be read to
mean that only fixed ceilings on the amount of recovery are impermissible. The verb "limit" is used. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "limit" as follows: "to assign to or within
certain limits;" "to set bounds or limits;" and "to curtail or reduce
in quantity or extent." It adds that the term "limit stresses the fact
of existence of boundaries, checks to expansion, or exclusions which
either are not passed over or cannot or may not be."' 1 8 Furthermore,
115. Id. at 738 (comment of Mr. Darlington).
116. Id. at 736 (comment of Mr. Gowen).
117. Id. at 741 (comment of Mr. Dodd).
118.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
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courts have recognized that the term "limit" is not synonymous with
such terms as "exempt" or "discontinue." In Jones v. Wells Fargo Co.
Express,iO the court construed a statute which prohibited any agreement "exempting" a common carrier from liability:
To exempt from liability is one thing and to fix or limit the
amount of damages is entirely another thing. Exempt means to
release, discharge, waive, relieve from liability. . . Limit is to
fix a point or boundary beyond which the subject cannot pass or
extend .... The liability for the loss . . . was not in any manner
exempted by limiting the damages to fifty cents per pound.'
Likewise, in Rosenfeld v. American Art Textile Printing Co., 12 1 which
involved interpretation of a lease which reserved to the landlord the
right to "limit" the amount of steam to be furnished, the court stated:
Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary defines "limit"
as "to set a bound or bounds to; keep in bounds; confine; restrict; [sic] and defines "discontinue" as "to break off, terminate
or cease from; bring to an end; stop." . . . [I]t was not the
intention of the parties that the landlords should have the right
at any time to discontinue or stop the sale of live steam. 2 2
The distinction between "abolition" and "limitation" can perhaps most
clearly be seen by considering the converse situation. Where an agency
is given the authority to "limit" a right, the agency is generally not
thought to have the authority to completely abolish the right.' 23
The definition of the term "limit" given in the dictionaries and
arrived at by the courts quoted above is important for purposes of
interpreting article 3, section 18 because "[i]t must be assumed that
the people who voted upon the Constitution gave to the words employed
their common and ordinary significance.' 12 Clearly the term "limit"
would be applicable to a law such as the Act of 1868, which set an
upper ceiling or boundary on the amount a victim could recover when
suing a negligent railroad. On the other hand, the term "limit" does
not seem applicable to a law which sets no upper boundary on the
119. 83 Misc. 508, 145 N.Y.S. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
120. Id. at 511, 145 N.Y.S. at 603.
121. 115 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
122. Id. at 24.
123. See, e.g., Dart v. City of Gulfport, 113 So. 441 (Miss. 1927) wherein the
court held that a zoning board's power to "restrict" did not constitute a power to
"destroy" or "prohibit" the erection of buildings, for "restrict" meant "to restrain
within bounds; to limit; to confine." Id. at 444.
124. Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Lawrence, 326 Pa. 526, 532, 193 A. 46, 49
(1937). See Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 434, 117 A. 440, 442 (1921) ("when
simple words are used in writing the fundamental law, they must be read according
to their plain, generally understood, or popular, meaning"). See also PA. STAT. tit.
46, § 533 (1937). That section, which is Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act,
states that "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar
and according to their common and approved usage."
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amount recoverable in an action, but rather merely attempts to exclude
minor or small claims. The language of the provision would also not
seem to apply to the total abolition of a class of tort actions, as
opposed to the setting of a limit on recovery in recognized actions
for damages.
Proposals for a no-fault system of auto accident compensation
have attempted to abolish small claims for pain and suffering. The
Keeton and O'Connell proposal,1" 5 for example, recommends the retention of a tort action for pain and suffering if the victim can prove
his damages for pain and suffering exceeded $5,000. That proposal
places no upper limit on the amount that can be recovered. Their
proposal has little in common with the Act of 1868, the law against
which article 3, section 18 was primarily directed, in that the proposal
would not deny full compensation to the seriously injured; the quantity
of damages that could be recovered in these serious cases would not
be limited. On the contrary, it could be argued that the position of
the seriously injured victim is stronger under the Keeton and O'Connell
proposals for two reasons: (1) elimination of small claims will reduce
court backlogs and enable the plaintiff to prosecute his action more
speedily and (2) access to speedy no-fault compensation for economic
loss will reduce the pressure on the victim to settle his claim quickly
for less than his full damage, thereby removing a "limit" imposed by
existing conditions.
Thus, several very important distinctions should be drawn between proposals for no-fault accident compensation and legislation
similar to the Act of 1868. No-fault proposals are designed to promote
fairer and more adequate compensation for the victims of car accidents.
A proposal such as the Keeton and O'Connell basic protection plan
would not reduce the amount that a seriously injured person could
recover. The Act of 1868, on the other hand, restricted even the
most seriously maimed or disfigured victim to a maximum recovery
of $3,000. Furthermore, the Act of 1868 was not part of a legislative
reform designed to improve compensation for victims of railroad accidents; the limit on recovery could only be justified as an economy
measure, sacrificing full and adequate compensation for the severely
injured victim. No-fault proposals, in marked contrast, are designed
to improve compensation for those seriously set back by auto accidents,
at the cost only of abolishing claims for small amounts of pain and
suffering, which are often exaggerated and without merit and which,
statistics show, are foreseeable for almost all vehicle occupants at some
time during their lifetime.
125. See R. KEETON & J.

O'CONNELL,
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Critics of our present tort law system of compensation argue that
the negligence concept of fault causes injustice and hardship when
applied to modern automobile accident cases. They maintain that
retention of the fault principle serves no real deterrent function because
liability insurance in most cases bears the cost of auto accidents." 6
Most of the arguments made by the proponents of article 3, section 18
in the constitutional debates would not be applicable to no-fault legislation designed to modernize the compensation system in light of these
new developments. Article 3, section 18 was designed to prohibit
legislation which would destroy the deterrent effect of large jury verdicts and prevent the fair and adequate compensation of victims of
negligence. No-fault proposals are consistent with these purposes.
They preserve a tort action in the event of serious injury and promote
more adequate compensation for all victims.
Neither the language of article 3, section 18 nor the stated purposes of its framers indicate that this provision was intended to
prevent the legislature from totally abolishing a common law cause
of action if, for example, the legislature decided that the cause of
action had outlived its original purpose and was no longer helpful in
promoting justice in the community. The language of the provision
does not say "the General Assembly shall not abolish causes of action
for injuries to person or property;" rather, it speaks only of placing
no limit on the amount to be recovered. Therefore, one may fairly
conclude that the framers intended that, so long as the legislature
considered a tort cause of action a useful social mechanism for the
achievement of justice, no legislation be passed that would place a
limit on the amount to be recovered in such an action. The language of
the provision does not compel the conclusion that an antiquated and
anachronistic cause of action cannot be wiped out by the legislature.
Such an interpretation would freeze the law of torts in a rigid, inflexible mold and prevent its adaptation to changing social conditions.
The total abolition of all tort actions in cases of automobile accidents,
to be replaced with a no-fault system of compensation, would not be
the type of legislation which article 3, section 18 expressly or impliedly
forbids. That this is a correct interpretation of that section is demonstrated by the fact that no constitutional obstacles have been encountered in Pennsylvania when the legislature has totally abolished
or modified traditional tort actions for injuries to persons or property. 27
Finally, it should be noted that further scrutiny of the precise
language of that section reinforces the conclusion that the framers
126. See, e.g., Note, Automobile Accident Compensation, 57 VA. L. REv. 409,
430-32 (1971).
127. See notes 135-58 and accompanying text infra.
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did not intend to deny the general assembly the power to abolish or
redefine tort causes of action. The pertinent language of article 3,
section 18 prohibits the general assembly from limiting the "amount
to be recovered for injuries." Pennsylvania decisions which have construed the term "injuries" indicate that this expression refers to "legal
wrongs" which would entitle a claimant to damages at common law
or from a statute. 2 ' As was seen with the case of Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,'2 9 the fact that article 3, section 18 prohibits placing limits
on the amount of recovery in tort actions does not preclude total
abolition of those causes of action when they have become outmoded
or unresponsive to the changing needs of society. Further, the decision
indicates that once a traditional tort cause of action has been wiped
out by statute, the prohibition against limitation of damages in article
3, section 18 would no longer be applicable.
In summary, it can be said that neither the plain language of
article 3, section 18 nor its historical background creates an insurmountable constitutional barrier to the implementation of some kind
of no-fault system in Pennsylvania, since the language of that provision is somewhat ambiguous and allows for the interpretations which
have been advanced. It should be emphasized, however, that the very
ambiguity of that section and its historical background will also provide opponents of a no-fault plan with the material with which to
fashion a forceful constitutional argument. This is truly a case where
the legal arguments on both sides carry considerable weight, and it
cannot be predicted with confidence which side would prevail in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
2.

Judicial Application

None of the Pennsylvania decisions which have dealt with article
3, section 18 provide clear indications as to how the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court could be expected to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of no-fault plans. The case law is sparse to begin with, and
the seriousness and depth of the analysis in the cases is weaker still.
The first cases of any significance applying the present article 3,
section 18 were, of course, concerned with the Act of 1868, which
limited the amount of damages recoverable in suits against railroads
for negligence, since the constitutional provision was aimed specifically
at that act. The act was voided by the Constitution of 1874 in Lewis
128. See note 93 supra.
129. 263 Pa. 158, 106 A.2d 238 (1919).
supra.
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v. Hollahan,'3 0 where the court gave the following interpretation of
that section:
[I]n endeavoring to determine the full scope and meaning of the
section, it should be considered, as a whole in the light of the
evil intended to be remedied by its adoption. It is very evident
that the evil at which it was aimed was the obnoxious statutory
limitation as to the amount of damage to be recovered ....
The purpose of the twenty first section of the third Article
of the Constitution was to nullify, as far as possible, then existing
legislation limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property . . . and,
at the same time, prevent all such legislation in the future. The
phraseology of the section as well as the discussion that took place
during the course of its adoption clearly indicates that such was
the intention of the framers of the Constitution.131
This decision acknowledges that the constitutional provision was primarily directed towards legislation such as the Act of 1868.132
Article 3, section 18 has been most frequently cited in cases involving Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation law. Commentators
who have considered the constitutionality of no-fault plans under the
federal Constitution have regarded cases involving workmen's compensation as providing the closest analogy for purposes of constitutional
133
analysis.
The Pennsylvania constitution was amended in 1915 to permit
the legislature to enact a workmen's compensation system. Because
of the fact that a constitutional amendment was made and that the
law itself is regarded as "voluntary," the courts of Pennsylvania have
never directly considered the question as to whether a compulsory workmen's compensation act would violate the Pennsylvania constitution. 34
Various dicta in cases decided under the Pennsylvania workmen's
compensation law indicate, however, that a compulsory law might be
regarded as a violation of article 3, section 18.
130. 103 Pa. 425 (1883).

131. Id. at 430.
132. See also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Bowers, 124 Pa. 183, 16 A. 836 (1889).
133. See, e.g., Cowen, Due Process, Equal Protection and No-Fault Allocation
of the Costs of Automobile Accidents, in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM 1, 29 (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Auto. Ins. & Compensation Study 1970), in which the author opined:
Both [no-fault plans and workmen's compensation] are concerned with the
prompt payment without regard to fault of at least a portion of the costs of
injuries received, in one instance in automobile accidents and in the other in the
course of certain specified types of employment. Both assess these costs, through

the medium of some sort of insurance plan, on one who may not be at fault;
both limit the recovery available.
134. See notes 47-54 and accompanying text supra. See also W. SKINNER, supra
note 50, at 48.
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It was seen in Dolan v. Linton's Lunch 35 that the general assembly
might well be able to abolish common law causes of action without
running afoul of article 1, section 11 of the constitution, if at the
same time it enacts a reasonable substitute therefor. The case, however,
makes little mention of article 3, section 18 with regard to possible
application to schemes like no-fault plans. It does leave open the interpretation that the court in that case was concerned with the payment
of "full actual damages," and that damages for pain and suffering
in cases of minor injury are not included within that term. "Pain and
suffering" are regarded as substantive losses in Pennsylvania and,
therefore, the notion of "full actual damage" might be held to include
the right to recover for pain and suffering.
The seriousness with which pain and suffering damages are
3 6 Being struck
viewed is illustrated by Burgan v. Pittsburgh."
by a
motorcycle, the victim in that case suffered very serious injuries, including fractures, permanent disfigurement, and a crippled leg. The
court stated, in connection with the recovery of damages for pain
and suffering:
Pain and suffering are substantive losses and, for the same
reason that a person is entitled to retain, against the encroachment
of others, the full and unimpeded use of his limbs, organs and
other parts of his body, so is he equally guaranteed freedom from
physical and sensory torment. Pain and suffering, while existing,
can be as much a disability as crippling, rupture, or dismemberment. It is the jury's duty to appraise the pain and the agony
of the anatomy in discord and to affix monetarily the responsibility
37
of the person or legal entity which broke nature's harmony.1
This strongly-felt sentiment would not necessarily refer to claims for
pain and suffering in cases of minor injury, but it must be taken as an
indication of how strongly the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might feel
about a no-fault plan which would deprive some seriously injured
claimants of full compensation for pain and suffering.
The most recent decision discussing article 3, section 18 is DeJesus
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co."" This case held that a workmen's
compensation insurance carrier is included within the term "employer"
as used in section 303 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,' 39 and
thus the insurance carrier shares the employer's immunity from
common law liability. The court further held that this interpretation
135.
supra.
136.
137.
138.

397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).

See text accompanying notes 90-91

373 Pa. 608, 96 A.2d 889 (1953).
Id. at 613, 96 A.2d at 891.
439 Pa. 180, 268 A.2d 924 (1970).
139. PA. STAT. tit. 77, § 303 (1952).
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of the Workmen's Compensation Act did not violate article 3, section
18. The court explained that the Pennsylvania constitution had been
amended to permit the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The court quoted that section, emphasizing the language "in no
other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries . . ." The court stated:
Both parties to the present action concede that the italicized
portion of the Constitution, as quoted above, precludes the enactment of legislation limiting the amount of compensation payable
to employees for injuries other than those "arising in the course
of their employment."
[W]e now specifically find that the purpose of Section 18,
as amended, was to permit the General Assembly to enact a workmen's compensation program, but to preclude the enactment of
general legislation covering injuries other than those arising in
the course of employment. . . . In the light of this purpose, particularly as applied to the instant situation, it is clear that Section
18, as amended, did not restrict the General Assembly to legislating
with respect to payments to be made by employers, as opposed to
payments to be made by insurers.14 °
It is doubtful, however, that the DeJesus statement that article 3,
section 18 precluded the enactment of general legislation covering compensation for injuries other than those arising in the course of employment, was intended to have the sweeping impact which its broad
language may suggest. If that provision precludes the enactment of
all legislation "covering injuries other than those arising in the course
of employment," it is difficult to see how several Pennsylvania statutes
which have abolished or substantially modified common law tort actions
for the recovery of damages to compensate for injuries to person or
property have evaded constitutional invalidation. 14' If indeed, article 3,
section 18 meant that the legislature was precluded from enacting any
140. 439 Pa. at 183-85, 268 A.2d at 926-27 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
141. The common law tort actions for alienation of affections and breach of
promise to marry have been totally abolished in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. tit. 48,
§§ 170 & 171 (1935). The only case in which the constutionality of these sections
was questioned is McMullen v. Nannah, 49 Pa. D. & C. 516 (C.P. Beaver Co. 1943).
In that case the court only circumspectly considered the issue, stating that the
"authorities, including those of Pennsylvania, are unanimously in favor of constitutionality." Id. at 522. One is therefore forced to speculate as to how the abolition of
the cause of action for alienation of affections could been reconciled with article
3, section 18. To be sure, if one could treat the complete abolition of the action
for alienation of affections as a limitation of less than zero damages, the statutory
provision would be rendered unconstitutional. The conclusion that is compelled by
the successful abolition of these and other common law causes of action is that
since "abolition" and "limitation" are not synonymous terms, the constitution must
absolutely prohibit only the latter.
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legislation which affected the amount of damages recoverable in tort
actions, tort concepts, no matter how mischievious or antiquated, which
for a long time had been a burden on society and the judicial system,
could not be discarded or reformed, rendering Pennsylvania's tort
system totally inflexible and unresponsive.
The abolition of tort actions to recover damages for minor claims
of pain and suffering can be analogized to the abolition of the tort
action for alienation of affections. According to Professor Prosser,
this tort action was a common law cause of action based on a tortious
interference with family relations. In an action for alienation of
affections, the aggrieved husband would sue the defendant for damages
for the loss of the love, comfort, society, and companionship of his
wife.' 42 The common law actions dealing with wrongful interference
with domestic relations, such as alienation of affections and breach of
promise to marry, were found by state legislatures to have been
peculiarly susceptible to abuse. According to Professor Prosser:
[I]t is notorious that [these actions] have afforded a fertile field
for blackmail and extortion by means of manufactured suits in
which the threat of publicity is used to force a settlement. There
is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type
are brought more frequently than not with purely mercenary or
vindictive motives; that it is impossible to compensate for such
damage with what has derisively been called "heart balm," that
people of any decent instincts do not bring an action which merely
adds to the family disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is
served, since such torts seldom are committed with deliberate
plan .... 143
Similarly, the cause of action for pain and suffering in cases of minor
injury in car accidents has been attacked as a source of vexatious litigation which does not serve the ends of justice.144 In a typical small
case, the certainty of closing the claim is worth more to the defendant
insurance company than it is to the claimant, and therefore small claims
are generally overpaid. 1 45 Furthermore, compensation for pain and
suffering in cases of minor injuries is widely believed to invite
exaggeration or fraud in claims. 4 "
In response to mounting evidence showing the actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise to be susceptible to abuse,
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 876 (4th ed. 1971).
143. Id. at 887.
144. VOLPE REPORT, supra note 3, at 131.
145. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-29; R. KEETON & J.
supra note 3, at 225-26.
146. Note, supra note 40, at 438.

142. W.
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legislatures in many states abolished these causes of action. Professor
Prosser commented on this legislative development:
[These statutes] reverse abruptly the entire tendency of the
law to give increased protection to family interests and the sanctity
of the home, and undoubtedly they deny relief in many cases of
serious and genuine wrong. It may be that they do away with
spurious suits at too great a price, and that other methods of
limitation or control are to be preferred. 4 7
Nevertheless, the facts are that the Pennsylvania legislature has already
enacted a statute which abolished the established common law right
of recovery of damages for a wrongful interference with domestic
relations and that this statute "undoubtedly" denies relief "in many
cases of serious and genuine wrong;" yet, the statute has not been
held to be unconstitutional. This demonstrates that article 3, section 18
does not preclude the legislature from wiping out a tort cause of
action for damages for injuries to person or property.
Further examples can be given of statutes passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly which wipe out common law causes of action
in tort for damages to person or property. Although the Medical Good
Samaritan Act 4 abolished a cause of action in tort where a person
is injured by a physician who, in good faith, renders aid during an
emergency unless the physician is grossly negligent or reckless, its
constitutionality has not been questioned. Likewise, neither the Nonmedical Good Samaritan Act' 49 nor several sections of the Disease
Prevention and Control Law of 1955, which sections provide that a
physician will not be liable for treating a minor for venereal disease
without his parents' consent, 5 ° have met with constitutional problems.
These provisions are apparently buttressed by the strong public policy
considerations that would encourage persons to render aid to those
in need and that claims arising from such actions serve no useful
function in promoting these aims of society. Similarly, such strong
policy considerations might underlie the institution of a no-fault
system, on the theory that, where the injured party can be made whole
for his medical damages within the system, the often exaggerated
claims for pain and suffering arising out of small medical claims are
so susceptible of abuse and so lacking in serving the useful function
147. W. PROSSER, supra note 142, at 887-88 (emphasis added).
148. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1641 (Supp. 1972), amending PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1641
(Supp. 1964).
149. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1643 (Supp. 1972), amending PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1643
(Supp. 1966) (abolishing a cause of action for ordinary negligence in connection
with emergency care rendered by a fireman, policeman, or other members of a
rescue squad).
150. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 521.1 to 521.21 (1964).
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of equitably reimbursing the injured party without mulching the
defendant that they should be abolished.
A Pennsylvania statute which changed the liability of an innkeeper or hotel proprietor for loss of personal property of guests' 5"
52
was upheld against constitutional attack in Sherwood v. Elgart.
This statute exempted a hotel proprietor for loss of personal property
which the guest left in his room and which was destroyed by an
"unintentional fire." An interpretation of article 3, section 18 to
include "abolish" within the meaning of "limit" would have rendered
the statute unconstitutional because the statute "limits" recovery for
losses of property to zero by entirely abolishing the guest's common
law right to recover for the negligence of the hotel owner. As was
explained in Kelly v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 15 3 "the common law made an
innkeeper a virtual insurer of all property of his guests. Since this
Act is in derogation of common law, it should be strictly construed."'5 4
Despite this contention and the fact that the statute abolishes a traditional tort recovery for negligence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
summarily rejected the argument that the statute offended the Penn1 55
sylvania constitution.
Another Pennsylvania example ot a statutory modification of a
common law tort cause of action is the statute providing that, in a tort
action for the conversion of property of fluctuating value, such as
securities, "damages shall be limited to the difference between the
proceeds of the conversion . . . and such higher value as the property
may have reached within a reasonable time after he [the owner] had
notice of the conversion.."156 At common law, damages for conversion
of property of fluctuating value were measured by the highest value
reached by the property between the time of conversion and the time
of trial. This statute terminated the "highest-value" period at the
expiration of a reasonable time after notice of the conversion. Such
a change of the traditional tort law measure of damages has been
recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a "limitation upon
the recovery of damages,""' and as being "in derogation of the common
law,' 158 yet the constitutionality of the statute has gone unquestioned.
The statutes discussed above furnish evidence that article 3,
section 18 does not pose a barrier to reasonable legislative efforts to
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

37, § 61 (1954).
383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955).
176 Pa. Super.316, 106 A.2d 636 (1954).
Id. at 318, 106 A.2d at 637.
Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 115, 117 A.2d 899, 902 (1955).
PA. STAT. tit. 68, § 481 (1965).
Foley v. Wasserman, 319 Pa. 420, 428, 179 A. 595, 599 (1935).
Wolfe v. Pennsylvania Co., 322 Pa. 344, 346, 185 A. 292, 293 (1936).
PA. STAT. tit.
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modernize the law of torts to keep legal rights and duties in step
with modern social and economic conditions. One qualification, however, should be added at this point. The power of the general assembly
to abolish or modify tort actions for fatal personal injuries may be
circumscribed by the language of article 3, section 18 which says that
in case of death, "the right of action shall survive."
A no-fault plan could easily avoid this problem, of course, so
long as it left the present tort action available in death cases. Because
the most serious shortcomings of the present tort system are related
to claims for pain and suffering in minor injury cases, leaving the
present tort action intact with respect to fatal injuries would not
be a serious compromise for those dedicated to accident compensation
reform.1" 9 This compromise may not be necessary, however, if one
subjects the precise language of article 3, section 18 to closer inspection.
The language says "the right of action" shall survive; this terminology
would leave open the possibility that survival was intended only for
those rights of action which the general assembly has not abolished.
Surely it is doubtful that an exception for fatal injuries would be
made by the courts for this statutory modification simply because of
the constitutional language in question. Should this argument fail to
persuade the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, modifications of
the no-fault system to deal with fatal accidents would have to be
made.160
3.

The View of the Commentators and Cases
Decided in Other States

Professors Keeton and O'Connell have apparently conceded that
provisions such as article 3, section 18 in state constitutions would bar
implementation of their basic protection plan by state legislatures:
The constitutions of a few states expressly forbid the enactment of any law limiting the amount recoverable for personal
injuries and death ....

In the past these provisions stood squarely

in the way of enacting a compulsory workmen's compensation
statute .

.

.

. Similarly, such provisions would seem to stand

clearly in the way of enacting the basic protection system. Although some states passed amendments to these provisions making
way for workmen's compensation acts, the amendments were
usually tailored only for workmen's compensation. . . . Thus
further amendments would be needed to enact the basic protection

system. It should be noted that Massachusetts and most other
states present no problem in this regard since they are without
159. R. KEETON & J.

O'CONNELL,

supra note 3, at 508.

160. Id. at 505-14.
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any constitutional provision proscribing the enactment of laws
limiting damages for personal injury.16'
It should be emphasized, however, that none of the commentators has
actually devoted intensive study to this particular constitutional issue,
and it appears that, in the case of Pennsylvania at least, they may very
well have prematurely leaped to the wrong conclusion. None of them
have confronted the point set forth above, namely, that provisions such
as article 3, section 18 have not been held to prevent the legislature
from passing any law which abolishes an antiquated or useless tort
cause of action, as opposed to passing a law which limits the amount
to be recovered under an unabolished cause of action.
Careful attention must be given to the precise language used in
these constitutional provisions. For example, one should compare
article I, section 16 of the New York constitution, which provides
that "[t] he right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation," with the language
of article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution, which provides
that "in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount
to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
persons or property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right
of action shall survive . . . ." A New York study concluded that the
New York constitutional provision would prevent the implementation
of a no-fault plan with respect to injuries causing death:
[L]oss to the survivors due to the death itself would not be
covered by our proposal [for no fault compensation], because
the New York State Constitution [article 1, section 16] forbids
any impairment of actions to recover damages for injuries resulting in death. The present tort action would thus continue to
be available in death cases. Fatal accidents could be compensated
efficiently under our proposed plan, and we would recommend that
the constitution be appropriately amended.' 6 2
The language in the Pennsylvania constitution is not as explicit or
compelling as that contained in the New York constitution. Indeed,
the difference in language between the provisions is a substantial indicator that a different result was intended in Pennsylvania, at least as
to non-fatal injuries.
161. Id. at 504-05 (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also Bishop, supra
note 24, at 43 ("[s]ome state constitutions undoubtedly contain provisions which
would have to be amended before the legislatures of such states could enact the plan
into law") ; Ruben & Williams, supra note 43, at 47 n.20.
162. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 3, at 86 n.139. For a discussion of the effect
of a provision such as article I, section 16 of the New York constitution on a basic
protection proposal, see R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 508-10.
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It is also very instructive to compare article 3, section 18 with
article 18, section 6 of the Arizona constitution, which provides: "[t]he
right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated,
and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." This language is markedly different from that of the Pennsylvania constitution; it expressly prohibits the abrogation of any
right of action to recover damages for injuries. In addition article 2,
section 31 of the Arizona constitution provides: "No law shall be
enacted in this State limiting the amount of damages to be recovered
for causing the death or injury of any person." This provision is
substantially identical to article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania
constitution. Obviously, cases decided under the Arizona constitution
can be distinguished for our purposes because of the express prohibition of Arizona's article 18, section 6. It is also interesting to note
that the Arizona legislature has not passed a statute abolishing the
causes of action for alienation of affections, seduction, or breach of
promise to marry, as has Pennsylvania.
However, Arizona does have a "Good Samaritan" Act, l1 3 similar
to the one in Pennsylvania, which exempts a physician from liability
for ordinary negligence in emergency situations. Yet this statute
would clearly be unconstitutional if the Arizona Supreme Court today
were to interpret the constitution of that state as literally as it did in
1917, when it considered the constitutionality of the state's "voluntary"
workmen's compensation laws. In a dictum about compulsory workmen's compensation acts, the court said:
A statute which would attempt to forcibly limit the amount
recoverable for personal injuries suffered would be in direct conflict with these plain, simple provisions of the state Constitution.
Statutes which provide a limited amount in satisfaction of damage
and leave to the parties interested the right to elect to abide by its
provisions are controlled by other principles of law and should not
be confused with statutes imperative in their terms.'
The constitution of Kentucky also contains a provision substantially
identical to article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution.
Section 54 of the Kentucky constitution reads: "The general assembly
163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1471 (1967).

164. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151, 167, 166 P. 278,
284-85 (1917), aff'd sub nom. Arizona Employer's Liab. Cases, 250 U.S, 400 (1919),
overruled on other grounds, Consolidated Ariz. Smelting Co. v. Egici, 22 Ariz. 543,
199 P. 132 (1921). This is the dictum which Professors Keeton and O'Connell felt
would stand in the way of their no-fault plan. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra
note 3, at 504-05. However, as was noted above there is no reason to believe that
this sentiment would necessarily prevail in Pennsylvania, where the constitutional
obstacles are less explicit and where there are precedents for the abolition of tort
actions.
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shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property." In addition,
section 241 of that constitution provides that "[w]henever the death
of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for such
death. . .

."

Furthermore, section 14 of the Kentucky constitution is

substantially similar to article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution. Under these provisions, the Kentucky guest statute, which
barred a tort action by a guest in an automobile unless the host were
"intentionally" reckless, was held to be constitutional in Ludwig v.
Johnson.'6 5 In the Ludwig case, the defendant argued that section 54
of the Kentucky constitution should not be read to prevent the legislature from abolishing a tort action:
It is insisted that this section of the Constitution does not guarantee the continuation of the right of action theretofore existent,
but merely applies to such causes of action as continue to exist,
and prohibits the Legislature from limiting the amount of damages
to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to
person or property so long as a right of action exists for such
injuries, but does not prohibit it from abolishing the right of
action. 66
It will be noted that this is the position herein taken with respect to
article 3, section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution. The Kentucky
court, however, rejected this argument:
When [section 54 of the constitution] is read in connection with
other sections of the same instrument, such as sections 14 and 241,
the conclusion is inescapable that the intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to inhibit the legislature from abolishing
rights of action
for damages for death or injuries caused by
1 7
negligence.

The court added:
The statute under consideration violates the spirit of our
Constitution as well as its letter as found in sections 14, 54, and
241. It was the manifest purpose of the framers of that instrument to preserve and perpetuate the common-law right of a citizen
injured by the negligent act of another to sue to recover damages
for this injury. The imperative mandate of section 14 is that every
person, for an injury done him in his person, shall have remedy
by due course of law. If the allegations of appellant's petition
are true, he has suffered serious injuries occasioned by the negli165. 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
166. Id. at 537, 49 S.W.2d at 349.
167. Id. at 538-39, 49 S.W.2d at 350.
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gent acts of the appellee .

. .

. The Constitution guarantees to

him his right to a day in court for the purpose of establishing
the alleged wrong perpetrated on him and recovery of his resultant damages.' 6 8
The Ludwig decision is obviously a precedent which, if it so chooses,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could decide to adopt and extend to
a no-fault statute. However, the court in Ludwig emphasized section
14 of the Kentucky constitution, which is similar to article 1, section 11
of the Pennsylvania constitution, so strongly as to suggest that the
failure of the guest statute to provide a substitute remedy was the real
defect in the legislation. Viewed in this light, even Ludwig would
not stand as a bar to a no-fault plan.
Two other states have constitutional provisions substantially similar to article 3, section 18. These are article 10, section 4 of the
Wyoming constitution and article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas constitution. In both of these states, however, there are also automobile
guest statutes. In spite of plaintiff's reliance on the Ludwig decision,
the Arkansas court held the guest statute to be constitutional in Rober6 9 Furthermore, neither the
son v. Roberson."
Wyoming guest statute 70
nor the Wyoming statutes abolishing actions for alienation of affections
or breach of promise to marry17 ' have been challenged on constitutional
grounds.
IV.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it appears that, of the three possible constitutional obstacles to the implementation of no-fault automobile accident
compensation proposals of the sort discussed in Pennsylvania, the
only serious problem arises from article 3, section 18. On the theoretical level, it would appear that the prohibition of any limitation on
the amount recoverable in a tort action, such as prescribed by that
section would not be violated by a total abolishment of the cause
of action for negligence in automobile injury cases, at least for
damages for pain and suffering as the result of minor injuries (as
opposed to death actions), so long as the no-fault plan is deemed to
be a reasonable substitute for the common law cause of action. Serious
problems remain, however, since article 3, section 18 may pose a bar
to the application of the no-fault plan to death actions. This would
prove to be a formidable defect in the goals of the system, considering
the fact that a substantial portion of the deaths caused by automobile
168. Id. at 542-43, 49 S.W.2d at 351.
169. 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937).

170. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (1967).
171. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-727 to 1-731 (1959).
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accidents occur instantaneously. It is questionable, however, how much
reliance can be placed on the existence of statutes abolishing common
law remedies in states whose constitutions contain provisions similar
to article 3, section 18 and where those statutes have not yet come
under constitutional attack. The reasons for this uncertainty are
twofold. First, the effects of statutes abolishing actions for alienation
of affections and for breach of promise to marry are not nearly as
far reaching and monumental in their scope as is a no-fault plan.
Secondly, the failure to attack such statutes on constitutional grounds
may be largely the result of apathy or lack of financial interest to
pursue the matter. Even without the aid of a crystal ball, it can be
said with relative assurance that the same will not be the case with
any no-fault plan that may be enacted. Such a plan is sure to come
under constitutional attack.
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